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HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY:
Do WE HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EQUALITYt
Nadine Strossentt
I. INTRODUCTION
Two important current controversies about free speech have
been the focus of academic and public policy debates. Both involve
unpopular types of speech that are said to cause harm to particular
individuals and societal groups, but have been protected under
traditional First Amendment principles. Recently, however, these
two types of speech have been the focus of new arguments for
suppression and have prompted calls for a re-examination and
revision of traditional free speech principles.
The first of these two closely related categories of allegedly
harmful speech is commonly called "hate speech." It conveys ha-
tred or prejudice based on race, religion, gender, or some other
social grouping. Advocates of suppressing hate speech claim that it
promotes discrimination and violence against those it describes.'
t This Article is based on the lecture Professor Strossen delivered at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law on April 4, 1995. By way of introduction, Professor
Strossen paid tribute to Sumner Canary, who was committed to effective representation of
his clients, to public service, and to legal education and scholarship.
tt Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Un-
ion. For research assistance with this Article, I would like to thank Ralph Toss, Sheree
Jeanes, Donna Wasserman, Thomas Hilbink, Marta Kiszely, and William Mills.
1. See, e.g., MARi J. MATSuDA Er AL., WORDs THAT WouND: CRrrICAL RACE THE-
ORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FuosT AMENDMENT (1993).
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The second, related type of controversial speech is a category
of sexually explicit speech that some prominent feminist scholars
call for censoring on the theory that it is, in essence, hate speech
against women, promoting discrimination and violence against us.2
Specifically, they want to suppress sexually explicit expression that
is "subordinating" or "degrading" to women.' They label this ex-
pression "pornography" to distinguish it from the subset of sexual
speech that the Supreme Court currently deems constitutionally
unprotected, and hence subject to banning under the label "obsceni-
ty."4 In contrast to the sexist harms that some feminists attribute to
the pornography they want to ban, the alleged harm targeted by
anti-obscenity laws is the undermining of the general moral tone of
society?
A central feature of U.S. free speech law, which distinguishes
it from the law of other countries, is the protection of controversial
and unpopular speech, including hate speech and pornography.
Probably the best known case that reaffirmed this strong free
speech concept was Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
America.6 In Skokie, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
argued that free speech rights extended even to neo-Nazis seeking
to stage a peaceful demonstration in Skokie, Illinois.' Skokie had a
large Jewish population, including many Holocaust survivors, who
were profoundly upset by the prospect of the proposed demonstra-
tion.8 The courts agreed with the ACLU that this demonstration
2. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24 (1981)
(arguing that pornography has a pervading male-dominant theme and degrades women);
Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1985) (arguing that pornography should be considered a civil rights violation
against women).
3. See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and
Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 25 (1985) (quoting a model anti-pornography law co-
authored by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon).
4. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Court set forth a tripartite
test for proscribable "obscenity": the "average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est .. . ; the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and . . . the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. (citations omitted).
5. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1973).
6. 373 N.E.2d 21 (11. 1978).
7. Id. at 23.
8. See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE,
AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 6-8, 27 (1979) (discussing the Jewish community's reaction
to the proposed march in Skokie).
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was constitutionally protected expression. 9
More recently, the ACLU has been the prime opponent of a
new incarnation of anti-hate speech laws that has become popular:
codes adopted by colleges and universities that prohibit hate speech
on their campuses. In these cases, too, we have been uniformly
successful in challenging the codes on First Amendment
grounds.'
The concept of suppressible pornography that some feminists
advocate-pornography as a type of hate speech-was enacted into
two municipal laws. The ACLU participated in lawsuits successful-
ly challenging both of them."
In the face of all these judicial rulings, there are intense pres-
sures to re-examine and reformulate the traditional American ap-
proach to hate speech and pornography. Recently, some prominent
legal scholars and liberal activists have joined forces with political
and religious conservatives to renew their arguments for suppress-
ing one or both types of speech. 2 In light of the changing politi-
cal climate throughout this country and the many recent personnel
changes on the U.S. Supreme Court, it is not clear whether our
legal system will continue to protect both hate speech and pornog-
raphy.'3
The United States saw just a hint of possible changes in this
9. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978); Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 21.
10. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993), affd, 55 F.3d
1177 (6th Cir. 1995); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys.,
774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989). Likewise, in a fourth legal challenge to another campus hate speech code,
the university agreed to rewrite its code to bring it into conformity with the First Amend-
ment. Wu v. Univ. of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn. 1990). The ACLU rep-
resented the parties that successfully challenged the hate speech codes in all of these
cases except Dambrot.
11. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1326 (D. Ind. 1984)
(holding that an Indianapolis, Indiana ordinance restricting pornography violated the First
Amendment), affd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Village
Books v. City of Bellingham, No. C88-1470D (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1989) (holding that a
Bellingham, Washington ordinance restricting pornography violated the First Amendment);
see also Nina Burleigh, Porn Ordinance Faces Challenge, Cmi. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1988, § 6,
at 7 (noting the ACLU's challenge to the Bellingham law).
12. See Nadine Strossen, Legal Scholars Who Would Limit Free Speech, CHRON. HIGH-
ER EDUC., July 7, 1993, at B1 (discussing law school conferences and law professors'
writings that explore strategies for limiting First Amendment protection of hate speech and
pornography).
13. Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography,
79 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1120-22 (1993).
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area only two days after the historic 1994 national elections. 4 On
November 10, 1994, the Clinton Administration filed a brief in the
Supreme Court in United States v. Knox, asserting a broad view of
the government's power to suppress pornography."5 This was the
Clinton Administration's second Supreme Court brief in the Knox
case, which had first come before the Supreme Court a year earli-
er. In its first brief, the Administration had advocated a narrow
construction of the anti-pornography statute at issue. 6 As an anti-
pornography activist noted, this about-face on the pornography
issue "'is the first indication of how the ... Clinton Administra-
tion will react in [the new, post-election] conservative world.'"'
II. OVERVIEW
I will first explain the traditional U.S. constitutional approach
to hate speech and pornography. Under this approach, such speech
is protected by a grand vision of the First Amendment that was
initially set out in the early decades of this century by Supreme
Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis. This
"free speech tradition"'8 has been carried forward by more recent
14. See Angry Public Gives U.S. Rightward List; Republican Majority in Both Houses;
First Since Eisenhower, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 1994, at 1 (noting that angry voters made
"40-year dream come true for Republicans and created a nightmare scenario for Demo-
crats"); First House Speaker Since 1960 Defeated, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Nov. 10, 1994, at
A59 (remarking that the historic Republican sweep of Congress swept away Tom Foley);
Paul West, GOP Sweeps to Victory in Momentous Power Shift, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 9,
1994, at Al (recounting that the Republican success was "broad and deep," with Republi-
cans winning governorships in seven of the eight most populous states and controlling the
statehouses of the nine most populous states).
15. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 745-47, 754 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the
federal statute criminalizing "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" of a
minor outlaws any depiction that "appeals to the lascivious interest of the intended audi-
ence," even if the minor is clothed and the "the contours of the genitals or pubic area"
are not "discernible . . . through the . . . clothing"; and rejecting a First Amendment
overbreadth challenge to the statute as thus construed), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 897
(1995); Justice: Nudity Not Issue in Child Porn, UPI, Nov. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, UPI file.
16. Respondent's Brief at 8-10, Knox (No. 92-1183), available in Westlaw, 1993 WL
723366; Justice: Nudity Not Issue In Child Porn, surpa note 15.
17. Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Changes Stance in Case on Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1994, at A15 (quoting John D. McMickle, attorney for National Law Center for Chil-
dren & Families, which led a coalition that filed a brief urging the Supreme Court to
affirm the Third Circuit's ruling in Knox).
18. This concept is examined by former University of Chicago Law School Professor
Harry Kalven. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
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Supreme Court Justices including, preeminently, Hugo Black, Wil-
liam 0. Douglas, and William J. Brennan, Jr..
After outlining this traditional free speech approach, I will
address the new arguments that some prominent legal scholars have
advanced for altering it. Although I ultimately reject these argu-
ments, they are important and worthy of serious consideration.
These arguments are based on another fundamental right under the
U.S. Constitution, which is of equivalent importance to the free
speech right: the right to equality before the law. The ACLU cer-
tainly takes the new equality-based arguments for restricting hate
speech and pornography very seriously. We have always been in
the forefront of defending equality rights, 9 including women's
rights."° As I explain in Part IV, though, censoring hate speech
and pornography would not effectively advance equality for women
or other disempowered groups, but to the contrary, could well
undermine their equality.
II. TRADITIONAL U.S. FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES REGARDING
HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY
Before discussing the recent equality-based arguments for and
against censoring hate speech and pornography, this Article will
first outline the traditional First Amendment tenets that underlie our
courts' current protection of these types of speech. While I wel-
come recent calls to re-examine these principles, my re-examination
convinces me of their enduring soundness.
Our law's traditional protection of all types of hate speech,
19. See Nadine Strossen, In Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil
Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143, 145-46
(1994) (describing the ACLU's efforts to advance racial justice, including through land-
mark court cases).
20. See generally Nadine Strossen, The American Civil Liberties Union and Women's
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (1991) (detailing the ACLU's prominent role in defend-
ing women's rights in the Supreme Court and other forums through its Women's Rights
Project and Reproductive Freedom Project).
I personally take the new equality-based arguments for restricting hate speech and
pornography so seriously that I have recently written one book, and co-authored another,
that specifically respond to these arguments. The book that I wrote alone focuses on
pornography, see NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEEcH, SEx, AND
THE FIGHT FOR WoMEN'S RIGHTS (1995), and the book that I co-authored focuses on
hate speech, see HENRY L. GATES, JR. Er AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX:
HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CFIVL LIBERTIES (1995). My co-authors include mem-
bers of racial and other minority groups who eloquently show that suppressing hate
speech does not effectively advance equality or combat discrimination. Some passages in
this article are drawn from these books.
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including misogynistic speech, reflects two cardinal principles at
the core of our free speech jurisprudence. The first specifies what
is not a sufficient justification for restricting speech, and the sec-
ond prescribes what is a sufficient justification.
A. Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement
The first basic principle requires "viewpoint neutrality." It
holds that government may never limit speech just because any
listener-or even the majority of the community--disagrees with or
is offended by its content or the viewpoint it conveys.2 The Su-
preme Court has called this the "bedrock principle" of the proud
free speech tradition under American law.22
In three recent cases, the Court enforced this basic principle to
protect speech with a viewpoint deeply offensive to many, if not
most, Americans. The first two involved burning an American flag
in political demonstrations against national policies' and the third
involved burning a cross near the home of an African-American
family that had recently moved into a previously all-white neigh-
borhood.24
The viewpoint-neutrality principle reflects the philosophy that,
in a free society, the appropriate response to speech with which
one disagrees is not censorship but counterspeech-more speech,
not less.' Rejecting this philosophy, the movements to censor
21. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-49 (1992) (holding that a
St. Paul, Minnesota anti-hate speech ordinance violated the First Amendment principle of
viewpoint neutrality).
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
23. See United States v. Eichlnan, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. at 397.
24. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2538. The Supreme Court held that burning a cross near the
home of an African-American family could not constitutionally be punished under a hate
speech law, which criminalized symbolic expression because of its viewpoint, thus violat-
ing the First Amendment. Id. at 2547-49. However, the Court stressed that the cross-burn-
ing could constitutionally have been punished under a law that-in contrast to the one at
issue-did not single out expression based on its viewpoint or content. Id. at 2550 ("Let
there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is
reprehensible. But [the government] has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such
behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire."). Viewpoint-neutral laws that
might be invoked against such a cross-burning include those against arson, harassment,
interference with the exercise of civil rights, intimidation, trespass, and vandalism.
25. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Those who won our independence . . . . knew that . . . the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies;
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones . . . . If there be
[Vol. 46:449
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hate speech and pornography target speech precisely because of its
viewpoint, specifically, its discriminatory viewpoint. For this rea-
son, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook struck down an anti-
pornography ordinance that the City of Indianapolis had adopted at
the behest of some feminists.26 Stressing that the law's fatal First
Amendment flaw was its viewpoint discrimination, Judge
Easterbrook explained that, under the ordinance,
Speech treating women in the approved way-in sexual
encounters "premised on equality"--is lawful no matter
how sexually explicit. Speech treating women in the disap-
proved way-as submissive in matters sexual or as enjoy-
ing humiliation-is unlawful no matter how significant the
literary, artistic, or political qualities of the work taken as a
whole. The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints in
this way.'
B. "Clear and Present Danger" Requirement
Any laws restricting hate speech or pornography would also
violate the second core principle of U.S. free speech law: namely,
that a restriction on speech can be justified only when necessary to
prevent actual or imminent harm, such as violence or injury to
others." This is often summarized as the "clear and present dan-
ger" requirement. To satisfy this requirement, the restricted speech
must pose an "imminent danger." '29 It may not just have a "bad
tendency," that is, a more speculative, attenuated connection to
potential future harm."
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.
Id.
26. In advocating the Indianapolis ordinance, these feminists worked together with
political and religious conservatives who also seek to stifle pornography. See Kathleen
Currie & Art Levine, Whip Me, Beat Me, and While You're at It Cancel My NOW Mem-
bership: Feminists War Against Each Other over Pornography, WASH. MONTHLY, June
1987, at 17.
27. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir.), affld 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
28. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("Mhe constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
29. Id. at 447-48.
30. See id.
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If we banned the expression of all ideas that might lead indi-
viduals to actions that may adversely impact even important inter-
ests such as national security or public safety, then scarcely any
idea would be safe, and surely no idea that challenged the status
quo would be. This point was emphasized by Judge Easterbrook
when he struck down the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance.
For the sake of argument, Judge Easterbrook assumed the correct-
ness of the law's cornerstone assumption that "depictions of
[women's] subordination tend to perpetuate subordination."3 Even
so, he concluded, the law was unconstitutional.32  Judge
Easterbrook explained,
If pornography is what pornography does, so is other
speech .. . .Efforts to suppress communist speech in the
United States were based on the belief that the public
acceptability of such ideas would increase the likelihood of
totalitarian government ....
Racial bigotry, anti-Semitism, violence on television,
reporters' biases-these and many more influence the cul-
ture and shape our socialization .... Yet all is protected
as speech, however insidious. Any other answer leaves the
government in control of all of the institutions of culture,
the great censor and director of which thoughts are good
for us.
Sexual responses often are unthinking responses, and
the association of sexual arousal with the subordination of
women therefore may have a substantial effect. But almost
all cultural stimuli provoke unconscious responses. Reli-
gious ceremonies condition their participants. Teachers
convey messages by selecting what not to cover; the im-
plicit message about what is off limits or unthinkable may
be more powerful than the messages for which they present
rational argument .... If the fact that speech plays a role
in a process of conditioning were enough to permit govern-
mental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of
speech.33
31. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
32. Id. at 329-30.
33. Id.
[Vol. 46:449
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C. Re-examination and Reaffirmation
As earlier stated, I have accepted the call by current advocates
of restricting hate speech and pornography to re-examine the land-
mark free speech rulings that set forth the foregoing two core
principles concerning viewpoint neutrality and "clear and present
danger." That re-examination has left me more impressed than ever
with the universal, timeless force of these rulings. They remain
relevant and persuasive, specifically in the context of the current
hate speech and pornography debates.
For example, consider the powerful concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Brandeis in Whitney v. California.4 The Whitney majority
upheld a long prison sentence that had been imposed on a woman
because she was a member of the Communist Labor Party, whose
platform advocated the violent overthrow of the United States
government.' Brandeis rejected the majority's approach in an
opinion that a later Supreme Court endorsed. 6 While Brandeis
was sympathetic to fears about potential speech-induced harms, he
eloquently explained that the United States constitutional philoso-
phy reflects and requires not fear, but rather courage, in the realm
of ideas. He also anticipated and responded to the concerns about
the relatively powerless status of certain members of our society,
including women, expressed by those who now advocate restricting
hate speech and pornography. Brandeis astutely warned that any
fear-based repression will be used against precisely those who are
relatively weak.
His words are familiar, but well worth considering again, as if
they were answering current arguments:
Those who won our independence ... believed liberty
to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret
of liberty .... They recognized the risks to which all
human institutions are subject. But they knew that ... it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
34. 274 U.S. 357.
35. Id. at 357-72.
36. In Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 449, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted the
view espoused in Brandeis's Whitney concurrence.
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proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones ....
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech . . . . Men feared witches and burned wom-
en ....
Those who won our independence by revolution were
not cowards .... They did not exalt order at the cost of
liberty .... Only an emergency can justify repression.37
These themes were eloquently echoed several decades later by
Justice Hugo Black, carrying forward the brave Brandeisian free
speech tradition for new generations. For example, in a McCarthy-
era case concerning laws restricting Communist ideas and speech,
Justice Black made a statement that applies to all restrictions on
any unpopular speech, including the current proposals to restrict
hate speech and pornography:
Ultimately all the questions ... really boil down to
one-whether we as a people will try fearfully and futilely
to preserve democracy by adopting totalitarian methods, or
whether in accordance with our traditions and our Constitu-
tion we will have the confidence and courage to be free.38
IV. CENSORING HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY WOULD
UNDERMINE, RATHER THAN ADVANCE, EQUALITY GOALS
As previously noted, before the government may restrict ex-
pression, it must show not only that the expression threatens immi-
nent serious harm, but also that the restriction is necessary to avert
the harm.39
Undeniably, the interests that advocates of censoring hate
speech and pornography seek to promote-namely, the equality and
safety of minority groups and women-are compellingly important.
However, advocates of suppressive laws cannot even show that
these laws would effectively promote the safety and equality of
minority groups and women, let alone that they are the necessary
means for doing so. To the contrary, from an equality perspective,
these censorship measures would be at best ineffective, and at
worst counterproductive.
37. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-77.
38. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 162 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
39. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
[Vol. 46:449
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For precisely this reason, Justice Black dissented from a 1952
Supreme Court decision that upheld an anti-hate-speech statute.'
Fortunately, this decision is no longer good law." Alluding to the
concept of a "pyrrhic victory," Black presciently wrote, "If there be
minority groups who hail this holding as their victory, they might
consider . . . this ancient remark: 'Another such victory and I am
undone."42
As an overview, this Article will first list the many reasons for
concluding that suppressing hate speech and pornography would do
more harm than good, specifically in terms of equality values. It
will then elaborate on several.
The reasons why suppressing hate speech does not promote,
and may well undermine, racial and other forms of equality include
the following. Because the pornography concept advocated by some
feminists is a type of hate speech, these points apply to it as well.
Censoring hate speech increases attention to, and sym-
pathy for, bigots.43
It drives bigoted expression and ideas underground,
thus making response more difficult.'
It is inevitably enforced disproportionately against
speech by and on behalf of minority group members
themselves.45
It reinforces paternalistic stereotypes about minority
group members, suggesting that they need special pro-
tection from offensive speech.'
It increases resentment towards minority group mem-
bers, the presumed beneficiaries of the censorship.47
Censoring racist expression undermines a mainstay of
the civil rights movement, which has always been
40. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267-76 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
41. Beauharnais has implicitly been overruled by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that defamation actions are subject to First Amendment con-
straints when they punish and deter speech on matters of public concern, and requiring a
public official bringing a defamation action to prove that the statement at issue was di-
rected at the official individually and not just a unit of government).
42. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 275.
43. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
DUKE LJ. 484, 559.
44. Id. at 560.
45. Id. at 512, 515, 556-58.
46. Id. at 561.
47. Id. at 486, 567-69.
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especially dependent on a robust concept of constitu-
tionally protected free speech.'
An anti-hate-speech policy curbs the candid intergroup
dialogue concerning racism and other forms of bias,
which is an essential precondition for reducing discrim-
ination.49
Positive intergroup relations will more likely result
from education, free discussion, and the airing of mis-
understandings and insensitivity, rather than from legal
battles; anti-hate-speech rules will continue to generate
litigation and other forms of controversy that increase
intergroup tensions."
Finally, censorship is diversionary; it makes it easier to
avoid coming to grips with less convenient and more
expensive, but ultimately more meaningful, strategies
for combating discrimination. Censoring discriminatory
expression diverts us from the essential goals of eradi-
cating discriminatory attitudes and conduct."
The following list outlines the specific reasons why suppressing
pornography does not promote, and may well undermine, the criti-
cally important goals of reducing discrimination and violence
against women. Many of these parallel my analysis of anti-hate
speech laws:
Censoring pornography would suppress many works
that are especially valuable to women and feminists. 2
Any pornography censorship scheme would be enforced
in a way that discriminates against the least popular,
least powerful groups in our society, including feminists
and lesbians. 3
It would perpetuate demeaning stereotypes about wom-
en, including that sex is bad for us.5 4
It would perpetuate the disempowering notion that
women are essentially victims.5
48. Strossen, supra note 43, at 567-69.
49. Id. at 561.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Strossen, supra note 13, at 1111, 1141-42, 1146, 1170.
53. Id. at 1111, 1141, 1143-47.
54. Id. at 1111, 1141, 1147-51.
55. Id. at 1111, 1141, 1151-53.
[Vol. 46:449
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It would distract us from constructive approaches to
countering discrimination and violence against wom-
en.
5 6
It would harm women who voluntarily work in the sex
industry."
It would harm women's efforts to develop their own
sexuality 8
It would strengthen the power of the right wing, whose
patriarchal agenda would curtail women's rights. 9
By undermining free speech, censorship would deprive
feminists of a powerful tool for advancing women's
equality.'
Finally, since sexual freedom and freedom for sexually
explicit expression are essential aspects of human free-
dom, censoring such expression would undermine hu-
man rights more broadly.6
Before I elaborate on a few of the common reasons for con-
cluding that censoring both hate speech and pornography under-
mines equality goals, I would like to quote Seventh Circuit Judge
Richard Posner (since he, too, was one of your Canary Lecturers),
who has recently supported one of the specific points I just listed
concerning pornography. Specifically, Judge Posner concurs in my
conclusion that censoring pornography would do more harm than
good to the women who earn their living in the pornography busi-
ness.62 As even censorship advocates recognize, any censorship
scheme would not prevent the production of all pornography, but
rather, would drive that production underground. However, this
development would be devastating to the women who would con-
tinue to work in the pornography business, as Judge Posner ex-
plained, from his law and economics perspective:
When an economic activity is placed outside the protection
of the law-as we know from Prohibition, prostitution, the
campaign against drugs and the employment of illegal
56. Id. at 1112, 1141, 1153-61.
57. Strossen, supra note 13, at 1112, 1141, 1161-63.
58. Id. at 1112, 1141, 1163-64.
59. Id. at 1112, 1141, 1164-66.
60. Id. at 1112, 1141, 1166-71.
61. Id. at 1112, 1141, 1171-72.
62. Richard A. Posner, Only Words by Catharine A. MacKinnon, NEW REPUtBIc, Oct.
18, 1993, at 31 (book review).
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immigrants-the participants in that activity will resort to
threats and violence in lieu of the contractual and other
legal remedies denied them. The pimp is an artifact of the
illegality of prostitution, and the exploitation of porno-
graphic actresses and models by their employers is parallel
to the exploitation of illegal immigrant labor by their em-
ployers. These women would be better off if all pornogra-
phy were legal.63
I will now expand upon several of the common reasons why
censoring hate speech or pornography would be as dangerous for
equality rights as for free speech rights.
A. Free Speech Is Especially Important to People Who Have
Traditionally Suffered from Discrimination
First and foremost, all groups who seek equal rights and free-
dom have an especially important stake in securing free speech.
Throughout history, free speech consistently has been the greatest
ally of those seeking equal rights for groups that have been subject
to discrimination. For example, the Civil Rights Movement during
the 1950s and 1960s depended on the vigorous enforcement of free
speech rights by the U.S. Supreme Court under the leadership of
Chief Justice Earl Warren.' This essential interrelationship was
forcefully described in a 1965 book by University of Chicago law
professor Harry Kalven, entitled The Negro and the First Amend-
ment.
65
Only strong principles of free speech and association could-
and did-protect the drive for desegregation. These principles al-
lowed protestors to carry their messages to audiences that found
such messages highly offensive and threatening to their most deep-
ly cherished views of themselves and their way of life. Martin
Luther King, Jr. wrote his historic letter from a Birmingham jail,'
but the Warren Court later struck down the Birmingham parade
ordinance that King and other demonstrators had violated, holding
that it had breached their First Amendment rights.67
63. Id. at 34.
64. See Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE WARREN
COURT: A RETROSPECIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed., forthcoming 1996).
65. HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
66. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T
WArT 77 (1964).
67. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
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The more disruptive, militant forms of civil rights pro-
test-such as marches, sit-ins, and kneel-ins-were especially de-
pendent on the Warren Court's generous constructions of the First
Amendment.' Notably, many of these speech-protective interpreta-
tions initially had been formulated in cases brought on behalf of
opponents of civil rights. 9 The insulting and often racist language
that some militant black activists hurled at police officers and other
government officials was also protected under the same principles
and precedents. 0
68. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902, 928 (1982)
(holding that the First Amendment protects the "emotionally charged rhetoric" of a speech
to several hundred people urging compliance with a boycott by black citizens against
white merchants and threatening violence against those who did not honor the boycott,
including a statement that "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores,
we're gonna break your damn neck," even though there were violent reprisals within
weeks after this speech); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12, 117, 128 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment protects a protest march seeking desegregation of Chi-
cago public schools, even though an "unruly" crowd of 1200 people had gathered to
throw rocks and eggs, and shout violent epithets at the marchers, such as "Get out of
here niggers-go back to where you belong or we will get you out of here" and "Get
the hell out of here or we will break your . . . head open"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 548-49 n.12 (1965) (protecting, under the First Amendment, a protest march of 2000
supporters of integration where 250 hostile onlookers created an "explosive" situation in
which police and other witnesses feared "bloodshed" and that "violence was about to
erupt"); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 242-44 (1963) (protecting, under the
First Amendment, a "noisy demonstration in defiance of dispersal orders" where "200
youthful Negro demonstrators were being aroused to a 'fever pitch' before a crowd of
some 300 people who undoubtedly were hostile," thus "creat[ing] a . . . danger of riot
and disorder").
69. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 13, 16 (1949) (overturning, as
violating the First Amendment, a breach of peace conviction of a man who made a race-
baiting speech that "incited" his large friendly audience inside a meeting hall, and "pro-
voked" a "hostile mob" of 1500 people outside the hall that the "[p]olice were unable to
control" because the mob was "howling . . . epithets" and throwing bricks, bottles, stink
bombs, and brickbats, breaking about 28 windows); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
702, 722-23, 724-25 (1931) (upholding a First Amendment right to publish, despite a state
law allowing an injunction against "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory periodical," a
newspaper that printed anti-Semitic statements, such as "Practically every vendor of vile
hooteh, every owner of a moonshine still, every snake-faced gangster . . . in the Twin
Cities is a JEW").
70. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34, 138 (1974) (reversing the
breach of peace conviction of a woman who had responded to a police officer who told
her son, "Get your black ass in the god damned car . . .," by stating, "[Y]ou god damn
m. f. police-I am going to [the Superintendent of Police] about this," on the ground that
the law was unconstitutionally overbroad); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527-28, 534
(1972) (reversing the breach of peace conviction of a black demonstrator who made sever-
al threatening statements to police officers, including, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill
you," on the ground that the law was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); Brown v.
State, 492 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Okla. 1971), vacated and remanded by Brown v. Oklahoma,
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The foregoing history does not prove conclusively that free
speech is an essential precondition for equality, as some respected
political philosophers argue.7 But it does belie the central conten-
tion of those who claim an incompatibility between free speech
and equality: that equality is an essential precondition for free
speech.72 This history also shows the positive, symbiotic interrela-
tionship between free speech and equality. As stated by Benjamin
Hooks, former Executive Director of the NAACP, "The civil rights
movement would have been vastly different without the shield and
spear of the First Amendment."'73
Like the Civil Rights Movement, the women's rights movement
also has always depended on a vibrant free speech guarantee. This
point was made by the lower federal court judge who initially
struck down the Indianapolis anti-pornography law, in the ruling
Judge Easterbrook affirmed in American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut.74 Interestingly, this federal district court judge was a
woman, Sara Evans Barker. She emphasized that advocates of
women's rights have far more to lose than to gain from suppress-
ing expression: "It ought to be remembered by ... all .. who
would support [this anti-pornography law] that, in terms of altering
sociological patterns, much as alteration may be necessary and
desirable, free speech, rather than being the enemy, is a long-tested
and worthy ally."'75
408 U.S. 914 (1972) (vacating a breach of peace conviction of a Black Panther, who had
referred to specific policemen as "mother-fucking fascist pig cops," on First Amendment
grounds).
71. See, e.g., Robert N. Beck, Liberty and Equality, 10 IDEALISTIc STUD. 24, 36
(1980) ("[L]iberty is more basic than equality ...."); Tibor Machan, Equality's Depen-
dence on Liberty, in 2 EQUALITY & FREEDOM 663, 664-65 (Gray Dorsey ed., 1977) (ar-
guing that liberty is an essential precondition for equality); D.D. Raphael, Tensions Be-
tween the Goals of Equality and Freedom, in 2 EQUALITY & FREEDOM 543, 555 (1977)
("[Fireedom appears to be a greater value than equality."). For the contrary view, that
equality is the source of all rights and liberties, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 273-74 (1977), and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PIL. REV. 164, 165-
66 (1958). But see H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 828,
845-46 (1979) (criticizing Dworkin's view that all liberties derive from the principle of
equality).
72. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 467.
73. Statement of Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director and CEO, NAACP, quoted in
Philip Morris Companies Inc., Press Release (May 7, 1990).
74. See supra text accompanying note 27.
75. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1337 (D. Ind. 1984),
affd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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B. Censorship Has Especially Victimized Members of Politically
Powerless Groups, Including Racial Minorities and Women
Just as free speech has always been the strongest weapon to
advance equal rights causes, censorship has always been the stron-
gest weapon to thwart them. Ironically, the explanation for this
pattern lies in the very analysis of those who want to curb hate
speech and pornography. They contend that racial minorities and
women are relatively disempowered and marginalized.76
I agree with that analysis of the problem and am deeply com-
mitted to working toward solving it. However, I strongly disagree
that censorship is a solution. To the contrary, precisely because
women and minorities are relatively powerless, it makes no sense
to hand the power structure yet another tool that it can use to
further suppress them, in both senses of the word.'
Consistent with the analysis of the censorship advocates them-
selves, the government will inevitably wield this tool, along with
others, to the particular disadvantage of already disempowered
groups.78 This conclusion is confirmed by the enforcement record
of all censorship measures, around the world, and throughout histo-
ry. The pattern of disempowered groups being disproportionately
targeted under censorship measures extends even to measures that
are allegedly designed for their benefit. This is clearly illustrated
by the enforcement record in the many countries that have out-
lawed hate speech, and the one country that has outlawed porno-
graphy as defined by some contemporary feminists.79
76. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and
Equality, 1985 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 20-21 ("Women have had to prove human status,
before having any claim to equality. But equality has been impossible to achieve, perhaps
because, really, women have not been able to prove human status.").
77. See Mark Tushnet, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Introduction, 1990 DUKE UJ.
193, 198. Commenting on Professor Charles Lawrence's article supporting hate speech
regulations and Professor Nadine Strossen's article opposing such regulations, Professor
Tushnet suggests,
Lawrence's essay . . . places much of what Strossen says under rather severe
stress-with one, for me, decisive exception. Strossen emphasizes, in a way that
Lawrence does not, that regulations of racist speech on campus are to be ad-
ministered by the very authorities who, if such regulations are adopted, will
have to be dragged into the regulations kicking and screaming. She is in my
view rightly skeptical about the proposition that these people would administer
the regulations in a way that Lawrence would find satisfying.
Id. at 198.
78. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, supra note 76, at 21 ("Mhe status of women does not
change . . . . Laws change, but our status stays fixed.").
79. See NADiNE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PoRNoGRAPHY 221-24, 229-32, 235-36 (1995)
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First, consider the historical enforcement record of anti-hate-
speech laws. The first individuals prosecuted under the British Race
Relations Act of 1965,8o which criminalized the intentional incite-
ment of racial hatred, were black power leaders.8' Rather than
curbing speech offensive to minorities, this British law instead has
been used regularly to curb the speech of blacks, trade unionists,
and anti-nuclear activists.82 In perhaps the ultimate irony, this stat-
ute, which was intended to restrain the neo-Nazi National Front,
instead has barred expression by the Anti-Nazi League.83
The British experience is typical. Although French law then
criminalized group libel, no one who made anti-Semitic statements
against Captain Alfred Dreyfus was ever prosecuted, despite the
tragic impact of these statements. In contrast, Emile Zola was
prosecuted for libeling the French clergy and military in his classic
letter deploring the anti-Semitic vendetta against Dreyfus,
"J'Accuse," and had to flee to England to escape punishment. A
similar enforcement pattern resulted under the German Criminal
Code of 1871, which punished offenses against personal honor.86
According to Professor Eric Stein, "[T]he German Supreme
Court ... consistently refused to apply this article to insults
against Jews as a group---although it gave the benefit of its protec-
tion to such groups as 'Germans living in Prussian provinces, large
landowners, all Christian clerics, and German officers . . . . "
In 1990, Canada's Supreme Court upheld an anti-hate-speech
(discussing enforcement experiences under censorship laws in other countries).
80. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73 (Eng.). The Act was amended in 1976 to elimi-
nate the requirement of proving intent. The amended law made it an offense to distribute
literature or to use words likely to stir up hatred against any racial group. In 1986, Par-
liament enacted the Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, which was designed to further ease
the prosecution's evidentiary burden in proving incitement to racial hatred. It criminalizes
conduct that is either likely or intended to "stir up" racial hatred. See Kenneth Lasson,
Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ.
161, 166, 171-73 (1987) (describing the subsequent amendments and alterations to the
Race Relations Act of 1965).
81. Lasson, supra note 80, at 169.
82. NEIER, supra note 8, at 153-55.
83. See id. at 157 (describing the banning of a planned march by the Anti-Nazi
League).
84. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHY THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
DEFENDS FREE SPEECH FOR RACISTS AND TOTALITARIANS 8 (n.d.).
85. Id. at 8-9.
86. Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 286 (1986).
87. Id. (quoting P. Paepcke, Antisemitismus und Strafrecht 86 (dissertation, Albert-
Ludwiegs-Freiburg i. Br., 1962)).
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law against a challenge under the free speech provision in
Canada's Constitution."8 Under this law, in 1993, Canadian cus-
toms officials detained at the U.S.-Canadian border a shipment of
fifteen hundred copies of a book called Black Looks: Race and
Representations, by the black feminist professor bell hooks.89
These books had been en route to several Canadian universities.'
Indeed, because Canada's anti-hate-speech law had previously been
used to suppress important expression-including that on behalf of
minority group rights-three Canadian Supreme Court Justices
dissented from the Court's 1990 decision upholding such laws,
leading to a closely split 4-3 ruling." As the dissent explained,
Although the [law] is of relatively recent origin, it has
[already] provoked many questionable actions on the part
of the authorities .... [Tihe record amply demonstrates
that intemperate statements about identifiable groups, partic-
ularly if they represent an unpopular viewpoint, may attract
state involvement or calls for police action. Novels such as
Leon Uris' pro-Zionist novel, The Haj, face calls for ban-
ning .... Other works, such as Salman Rushdie's Satanic
Verses, are stopped at the border .... Films may be tem-
porarily kept out, as happened to a film entitled "Nelson
Mandela," ordered as an educational film by Ryerson
Polytechnical Institute .... Arrests are even made for
distributing pamphlets containing the words "Yankee Go
Home."'
The foregoing examples simply illustrate a longstanding, ongo-
ing global pattern. That was made clear in a book published in
1992 by Article XIX, the London-based International Centre
Against Censorship, which takes its name from the free speech
guarantee in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article
19. 9
3
88. Regina v. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d 1, 72 (Can. 1990).
89. Leanne Katz, Censors' Helpers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, §1, at 21. This author,
bell hooks, writes her name without initial capital letters.
90. I.
91. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 73.
92. Id. at 120 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
93. See STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992). This valuable book was based on an interna-
tional conference in 1991, in which I had the privilege of participating. It brought togeth-
er legal experts from fourteen different countries to compare notes about their respective
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Two conclusions clearly emerged from this book's comparative
analysis. First, the enforcement of anti-hate speech laws does not
correlate at all with successful national experiences in countering
discrimination or promoting equality and tolerance among different
racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Second, the enforcement of
such laws often undermines the goals of promoting intergroup
harmony and societal equality, for several reasons, including their
disproportionate enforcement against minority group speakers.94
The general international pattern of disproportionate enforce-
ment of legal measures curbing hate speech against minority group
members also holds true on university and college campuses, where
such measures have recently been most vigorously advocated in the
United States. In 1974, in a move aimed at the neo-Nazi National
Front, the British National Union of Students (NUS) resolved that
"representatives of 'openly racist and fascist organizations' were to
be prevented from speaking on college campuses 'by whatever
means necessary (including disruption of the meeting)."' 95 A ma-
jor motivation for the rule was to stem an increase in campus anti-
Semitism.9 Ironically, though, following the United Nations'
cue,97 some British students deemed Zionism a form of racism
beyond the bounds of permitted discussion.9 Accordingly, in
1975, British students invoked the NUS resolution to disrupt
speeches by Israelis and Zionists, including the Israeli ambassador
to England.99 The intended target of the NUS resolution, the Na-
tional Front, applauded this result.'" The NUS itself, though, be-
came disenchanted by this and other unintended consequences of
its resolution and repealed it in 1977. '
The British experience under its campus anti-hate-speech rule
parallels the more recent U.S. experience. The U.S. campus hate
national experiences with various laws punishing hate speech.
94. See id.
95. NEIER, supra note 8, at 155 (quoting the British National Union of Students reso-
lution).
96. Id.
97. See G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975) (declaring Zionism a form of racism). The United Nations revoked that
resolution in 1991. G.A. Res. 86, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 39, U.N.
Doc. A/46/86 (1991).
98. NEIER, supra note 8, at 155.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 156.
101. Id. at 155-56 (adding that some conservatives who were "very far from being
Fascists" also were barred from speaking under the NUS resolution).
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speech code about which we have the most enforcement data is
one that was in effect at the University of Michigan from April
1988 until October 1989. Because the ACLU brought a lawsuit to
challenge the code, the University was forced to disclose informa-
tion, which otherwise would have been unavailable to the public,
about how the code had been enforced.
During the year and a half that the University of Michigan rule
was in effect, there were more than twenty cases of whites charg-
ing blacks with racist speech.'" The only two instances in which
the rule was used to punish racist speech, as opposed to other
forms of hate speech, involved the punishment of speech by black
students." The only student who was subjected to a full-fledged
disciplinary hearing under the Michigan rule was an African-Ameri-
can student accused of homophobic and sexist expression." In
seeking clemency from the punishment that was imposed on him
after this hearing, the student said that he had received such harsh
treatment in large part because of his race.' 5
Others who were punished at Michigan included several Jewish
students accused of anti-Semitic expression and an Asian-American
student accused of making an anti-black comment. The Jewish
students wrote graffiti, including a swastika, on a classroom black-
102. Jeff Gottlieb, Banning Bigoted Speech: Stanford Weighs Rules, SAN JOSE MERCU-
RY-NEws, Jan. 7, 1990, at 1B, 3B.
103. Plaintiff's Exhibit Submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1,
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. S9-CV-71683-DT)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Exhibit] (stating that a black student was punished for using the
term "white trash" in an argument with a white student); id. at 5 (reporting that, in a
faculty-led small group discussion designed to "identify concerns of students" in a dentist-
ry course, a student was punished under hate speech code for saying that his minority
roommate had told him that minorities were treated unfairly in the course-the faculty
member, who was black, complained that the student was accusing her of racism).
104. Id. at 6 (describing a social work student who was charged with violating the code
because he said in class that homosexuality is an illness that needs to be cured and that
he had developed a model to move gay men and lesbians toward a heterosexual orienta-
tion).
105. Letter from an undisclosed student to James J. Duderstadt, President, University of
Michigan (the name and signature of the student were deleted from the copy produced
during litigation, to protect the student's privacy) (May 23, 1989), reprinted in Plaintiff's
Exhibit, supra note 103, at 852. The student wrote,
[T[he charges were pretexual [sic] and a coverup for vindictiveness based on
my refusal to support any radical movements . . . . Moreover, these few stu-
dents knew that a black student would have no chance of wining [sic] a favor-
able decision against such charges. These charges will haunt me for the rest of
my life . . . . mhey will be used against me to prevent me from becoming a
certified Social Worker ....
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board, saying they intended it as a practical joke."° The Asian-
American student's allegedly hateful remark was to ask why black
people feel discriminated against; he said he raised this question
because the black students in his dormitory tended to socialize
together, making him feel isolated. 7
The available information indicates that other campus hate
speech codes are subject to the same enforcement patterns. For
example, the ACLU successfully represented the student who chal-
lenged the University of Connecticut's hate speech code.0 8 This
student, who had been penalized for an allegedly homophobic
remark, was Asian-American. She claimed that other students had
engaged in similar expression but that she had been singled out for
punishment because of her ethnic background."°
C. Censorship of Sexual Expression Has Particularly Harmed
Women and Women's Rights Advocates
What lesson do we learn from the anti-hate-speech enforcement
record that I have outlined? It is this: If you belong to a group
that has traditionally suffered discrimination, including women,
restrictions on hate speech are especially likely to be wielded
against your speech. In fact, all forms of censorship have consis-
tently been used to suppress speech by, about, and for women. Of
particular importance for the current pornography debate, laws
permitting the suppression of sexually-oriented information have
often been used to suppress information essential for women's
rights, including reproductive freedom.
In the United States, anti-obscenity laws consistently have been
used to suppress information about contraception and abortion. The
first federal anti-obscenity statute in this country, the "Comstock
Law" enacted in 1873, was repeatedly used to prosecute pioneering
feminists and birth control advocates early in this century."0 Its
targets included Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parent-
hood."'
106. Plaintiff's Exhibit, supra note 103, at 1-2.
107. Id. at 2-3.
108. Wu v. Univ. of Conn. (No. Civ. H89-649 PCD) (D. Conn. 1989).
109. Letter from Martin Margulies, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, to author 5 (Jan.
23, 1990) (on file with author).
110. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression
Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 741, 748 (1992).
111. See id. at 766-67 (describing attacks on Sanger under the Comstock Law for pub-
[Vol. 46:449
1996] HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY 471
Sanger also had the dubious distinction of being one of the
first victims of a new form of censorship that was applied to a
then-new medium early in this century. The U.S. Supreme Court
had ruled in 1915 that movies were not protected "speech" under
the First Amendment."2 One of the first films banned under that
decision was Birth Control, a 1917 picture produced by and fea-
turing Margaret Sanger."'
The banning of films concerning birth control and other sexual-
ly-oriented subjects of particular interest to feminists continued in
the United States into the second half of this century. This fact
was stressed by UCLA Law Professor Kenneth Karst when he
urged pro-censorship feminists to think twice about arguing that
pornography should not be constitutionally protected speech."4
Karst noted that, until the 1950s, censors routinely banned films
that treated sexual themes of particular concern to women, includ-
ing pregnancy, birth control, abortion, illegitimacy, prostitution, and
divorce.' 
s
We now have actual experience with a feminist-style anti-por-
nography law in one country: Canada. In 1992, the Canadian Su-
preme Court incorporated the pro-censorship feminists' definition of
pornography into Canada's obscenity law in Butler v. The
Queen."6 The court held that, henceforth, the obscenity law
would bar sexual materials that are "degrading" or "dehumanizing"
to women."'
lishing information on birth control in a newspaper). Just before this article went to press,
in February 1996, Congress enacted and President Clinton signed into law, the Communi-
cations Decency Act, which extends the Comstock Law's criminal prohibitions on expres-
sion concerning abortion to on-line communications technology. The ACLU immediately
sought a temporary restraining order against the law, on behalf of clients including the
Planned Parenthood Foundation of America, on the ground that it violates both free
speech and women's rights. See ACLU v. Reno, No. 96-963, 1996 LEXIS 1617 (E.D.
Pen. Feb. 16, 1996) (granting a temporary restraining order).
112. Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915), over-
ruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
113. See Message Photo-Play Co. v. Bell, 166 N.Y.S. 338 (1917).
114. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subor-
dination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, 136.
115. Id. at 129.
116. 1 S.C.R. 452 (1992) (Can.).
117. Id. at 478-81. The Canadian Supreme Court construed the statutory requirement that
obscenity involves "the undue exploitation of sex" as being satisfied by "degrading or
dehumanizing" depictions of sex, because "a substantial body of opinion . . . holds that
the portrayal of persons being subjected to degrading or dehumanizing sexual treatment
results in harm, particularly to women .... " Id.
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Alas for women, though, the enforcement record under this law
has followed the familiar pattern; it has harmed the very groups
that it was supposed to help. The particular victims of Canada's
new censorship regime have been the writings and bookstores of
women, feminists, lesbians, and gay men."8 Within the first two
and a half years after the Butler decision, approximately two-thirds
of all Canadian feminist bookstores had materials confiscated or
detained by customs." 9 Butler's supposed rationale is to protect
women from works that harm them; it is hard to understand how
the feminist writings that have been seized under this decision
would harm women.
Ironically, some feminist material has been suppressed under
Butler on the ground that it is allegedly degrading and harmful not
to women, but to men."2 In the ultimate irony, two books written
by a leading U.S. anti-pornography feminist, the New York writer
Andrea Dworkin, were seized at the U.S.-Canada border.'' Ac-
cording to Canadian customs officials, they illegally "eroticized
pain and bondage."'2
Although the primary targets of Canada's post-Butler enforce-
ment efforts have been feminist, lesbian, and gay materials, Butler
has also emboldened customs officials to seize other works, includ-
ing serious mainstream books. Canadian Customs has seized books
by critically acclaimed authors such as Kathy Acker, Ambrose
Bierce, Marguerite Duras, Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston,
David Leavitt, Audre Lorde, Anne Rice, Gertrude Stein, and Oscar
Wilde."
118. Canada Customs Hits Feminist Stores and Others, FEMINIST BOOKSTORE NEWS,
MariApr. 1993, at 11, 21.
119. Id. at 22 (noting that 5,000 titles had been banned in Canada by 1992).
120. See, e.g., id. at 21 (stating that Canadian Customs seized a book entitled Weenie
Toons: Women Artists Mock Cocks, on the ground that it was degrading to the penis);
Bill Redden, 0 for Christ's Sake Canada, PDXS (PORTLAND), Aug. 30-Sept. 12, 1993, at
3 (discussing the banning of books featuring the cartoon character Lesbian Hothead
Paisan, a "lesbian terrorist avenger," who attacks certain men).
121. Pierre Berton, How Otto Jelinek Guards Our Morals, TORONTO STAR, May 29,
1993, at H3; see also Albert Nerenberg, Fear Not, Brave Canadian, Customs Stands on
Guard for Thee, GAZETTE (MONTREAL), Jan. 22, 1993, at A2 (reporting that the two
books by Dworkin that were seized were Pornography: Men Possessing Women and Wom-
an Hating).
122. Sarah Scott, Porn Police: Who Decides What to Ban at the Border?, GAZETTE
(MONTREAL), Apr. 14, 1993, at Al, A15.
123. STROSSEN, supra note 79, at 238-39; see also Tim Kingston, Canada's New Porn
Wars: "Little Sister" GaylLesbian Bookstore Battles Canadian Customs, S.F. BAY TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1993, at 1 (discussing Canada's banning of books by Marguerite Duras and
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D. Restricting Sexual Expression Undermines Human Rights
More Broadly
I will now turn to one final example of the adverse impacts on
equality goals that follow from censoring any hate speech, includ-
ing pornography. Recall that the pro-censorship feminists' concep-
tion of suppressible pornography is sexually explicit sexist expres-
sion. To highlight the dangers of this concept, I would like to
underscore the positive role that sexual expression plays in advanc-
ing human freedom.
Sexual expression is an integral aspect of human freedom.
Hence, governments that repress human rights in general have
always suppressed sexual speech. Correspondingly, laws against
sexual speech have always targeted views that challenge the pre-
vailing political, religious, cultural, or social orthodoxy. 24
Sexually explicit speech has been banned by the most repres-
sive regimes, including Communism in the former Soviet Union,
Eastern bloc countries, and China, apartheid in South Africa, and
fascist or clerical dictatorships in Chile, Iran, and Iraq. Conversely,
recent studies of Russia have correlated improvements in human
rights, including women's rights, with the rise of free sexual ex-
pression.
In places where real pornography is conspicuously absent,
tellingly, political dissent is labeled as such. The Communist gov-
ernment of the former Soviet Union suppressed political dissidents
under obscenity laws. In 1987, when the Chinese Communist gov-
ernment dramatically increased its censorship of books and maga-
zines with Western political and literary messages, it condemned
them as "obscene," "pornographic," and "bawdy." The white su-
premacist South African government banned black writing as "por-
nographically immoral."'" In Nazi Germany and the former Sovi-
et Union, Jewish writings were reviled as "pornographic," as were
any works that criticized the Nazi or Communist party, respective-
Ambrose Bierce); Jerald Moldenhauer, Books and Periodicals Seized by Canada Customs
Since the Introduction of Memorandum D9-1-1 in 1985 (unpublished, on file with author)
(cataloging books seized by Canadian Customs).
124. See Pete Hamill, Women on the Verge of a Legal Breakdown, PLAYBOY, Jan.
1993, at 140, 189; see also Alan Dershowitz, What Is Porn?, ABA J., Nov. 1, 1986, at
36 (discussing how anti-pornography laws have historically protected the prevailing ma-
jority view).
125. STROSSEN, supra note 79, at 219.
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Even in societies that generally respect human rights, including
free speech, the terms "obscenity" and "pornography" tend to be
used as epithets to stigmatize expression that is politically or so-
cially unpopular. Obscenity laws have been enforced against indi-
viduals who have expressed disfavored ideas about political or
religious subjects. 27 One of the earliest British obscenity prosecu-
tions, in the eighteenth century, was brought by the Tory govern-
ment to imprison its leading Whig opponent, John Wilkes.s In
early American history, anti-obscenity laws targeted speech that
was offensive to the prevailing religious orthodoxy.'29
The pattern holds today. Obscenity laws in the United States
regularly have been used to suppress expression of those who are
relatively unpopular or disempowered, whether because of their
ideas or because of their membership in particular societal
groups. 3 Recent major obscenity prosecutions have targeted ex-
pressions by or about members of groups that are powerless and
unpopular, including rap music of young African-American men
and homoerotic photographs and other works by gay and lesbian
artists.' Likewise, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)
has been subject to many political attacks for its funding of art
exploring feminist or homoerotic themes.'32 This point was recog-
nized by the federal district court judge in the "NEA Four" case,
in which the ACLU represented four artists whose NEA grants
were cut off because of their works' controversial political and
sexual themes. He wrote, "The NEA has been the target of con-
gressional critics .. .for funding works .. .that express women's
anger over male dominance in the realm of sexuality or which
endorse equal legitimacy for homosexual and heterosexual practices."'3
126. Dershowitz, supra note 124, at 36.
127. STROSSEN, supra note 79, at 220.
128. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§12-16 (2d ed. 1988).
129. STROSSEN, supra note 79, at 57.
130. Id. at 56-57.
131. See id. at 54-55 (discussing recent prosecutions involving the music of 2 Live
Crew and the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe).
132. See id. at 20, 37, 55, 101-02, 104-05, 156 (summarizing recent right-wing attacks
on the National Endowment for the Arts in which, for example, NEA grants were criti-
cized in general as being "inconsistent with 'traditional family values"' and where the
funding of Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs was specifically attacked by Senator Jesse
Helms who said "There is a big difference between 'The Merchant of Venice' and a
photograph of two males of different races on a marble table top").
133. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (C.D. Cal.
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One recent obscenity prosecution in Ohio vividly displayed the
characteristic hallmarks of such prosecutions-specifically, the
targeting of expression with an unpopular political message and the
persecution of gays and lesbians. During the summer of 1994, the
City of Cincinnati brought obscenity charges against a gay and
lesbian bookstore, the Pink Pyramid, and its owner, its manager,
and its clerk. These individuals, who were arrested and handcuffed,
faced sentences of up to six month's imprisonment and fines of up
to $1,000.14
Their "crime"? They had rented out a video of the film "Salo,
120 Days of Sodom," by Pier Paolo Pasolini, a world-renowned
Italian filmmaker, novelist, and poet. The film's sexual-political
subject is the dark aspect of sexuality that had served Italian fas-
cism. 3' According to film critic Peter Bondanella, Salo "is a des-
perate ... attack against ... a society dominated by manipulative
and sadistic power."'36
Just as the allegedly obscene video itself had a deeply political
message, so too did the charges against those who rented it out.
These prosecutions were announced on the opening day of a feder-
al lawsuit brought by the ACLU and Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund challenging a referendum that had overturned gay
and lesbian civil rights legislation.'37 As the National Coalition
Against Censorship commented, "At best, the timing suggests indif-
ference to the possibility that these prosecutions would exacerbate
already existing prejudices and intolerance."'3 At worst, given the
frivolous nature of obscenity charges based on a film of such in-
disputably serious value, the prosecution was a calculated act of
harassment. Accordingly, the ACLU filed a brief on behalf of an
impressive array of individuals and organizations from the worlds
of film, art, and academia, urging the court to dismiss these charg-
1992).
134. STROSSEN, supra note 79, at 105.
135. Id.
136. Letter from Jeremiah Gutman, Jo List Levinson, and Leanne Katz to Terrence
Robert Cosgrove, Cincinnati Prosecutor 2 (July 27, 1994) (quoting Peter Bondanella) (on
file with author).
137. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). The Plaintiff challenged the
city charter amendment prohibiting enactment of any ordinance that could be construed as
giving preferential treatment or special status to gay men or lesbians. The lower court
ruled that the amendment was unconstitutional. Id. at 830, 836, 844.
138. Letter from Jeremiah Gutman, Jo List Levison, and Leanne Katz to Terrence R.
Cosgrove, supra note 135, at 3.
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es before subjecting the defendants to a pointless and chilling
criminal trial.'39 The judge rejected this argument."'
The historical and ongoing enforcement record of laws against
sexual speech make clear that what is at stake is more than free-
dom of sexual expression, important as that is. Even beyond that,
the freedom to produce or consume anything called "pornography"
is an essential aspect of the freedom to defy prevailing political
and social mores. As Stanford University Law Professor Kathleen
Sullivan wrote, "In a world where sodomy may still be made a
crime, gay pornography is the samizdat of the oppressed.' 141 Fur-
thermore, just as gay pornography is the samizdat of individuals
who are oppressed or dissident sexually, pornography in general is
the samizdat of those who are oppressed or dissident in any re-
spect.
UCLA Law Professor Kenneth Karst provides intriguing in-
sights into the link between sexual freedom, including free sexual
expression, and freedom from discrimination:
The suppression of Unreason is rooted in the same fears
that produce group subordination: men's fear of the femi-
nine, whites' fear of blackness, heterosexuals' anxiety about
sexual orientation. Historically, all these fears have been
closely connected with the fear of sexuality. It is no acci-
dent that the 1960s, a period of sexual "revolution," also
saw the acceleration of three movements that sought major
redefinitions of America's social boundaries: the civil rights
movement, the gay liberation movement, and the women's
movement. 42
139. Memorandum of Amici Curiae the Film Society of Lincoln Center et al. in support
of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, City of Cincinnati v. The Pink Pyramid, No.
94CRB021247.
140. City of Cincinnati v. The Pink Pyramid, Docket No. 94CRB021245 (Hamilton
County Municipal Court, Nov. 3, 1994). However, the judge subsequently granted a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment on another ground: that the videotape had been seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
141. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity and the
Assault on Genius, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1992, at 35 (book review). "Samizdat" refers
to underground publications, containing dissident political views, in the former Soviet Un-
ion. See RoY D. LAiRD & BETTY A. LAIRD, A SovIEr LEXICON: IMPORTANT CONCEPTS,
TERMS, AND PHRASES 97 (1988) ("Samizdat" is an "unofficial publication and duplicating
of manuscripts by copying stories, poems, plays, articles, novels, and even nonfiction
works . . . . The practice was particularly stimulated in the 1960's by the fear of the
restoration of Stalin's image.").
142. Karst, supra note 114, at 103-04.
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For the reasons Professor Karst articulates, free sexual expres-
sion is intimately connected with equality-hardly at odds with it,
as argued by the anti-pornography feminists. Indeed, free sexual
expression is an integral aspect of all human freedom, even beyond
freedom from discrimination. This vital interconnection was elo-
quently stated by Dr. Gary Mongiovi, who teaches at St. John's
University in New York:
Sexual expression is perhaps the most fundamental
manifestation of human individuality. Erotic material is
subversive in the sense that it celebrates, and appeals to,
the most uniquely personal aspects of an individual's emo-
tional life. Thus, to allow freedom of expression and free-
dom of thought in this realm is to ... promote diversity
and nonconformist behavior in general ....
It is no coincidence that one of the first consequences
of democratization and political liberalization in the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China was a small ex-
plosion of erotic publications .... Suppression of pornog-
raphy is not just a free-speech issue: Attempts to stifle
sexual expression are part of a larger agenda directed at the
suppression of human freedom and individuality more gen-
erally. 143
V. CONCLUSION
I would like to close by quoting a powerful, timeless statement
by former Supreme Court Justice Black. Significantly, Black is as
justly remembered for his heroic championship of equality rights as
for his staunch free speech absolutism.'" In this 1951 statement,
Justice Black was specifically referring to the ideology of Commu-
nism, which was then seen as especially harmful, and hence espe-
cially worthy of suppression. However, Justice Black's wise words
apply equally to the ideologies of racism and sexism, which are
now seen as especially harmful, and hence especially worthy of
suppression.
143. Gary Mongiovi, Ph.D., Letters to the Editor, CIVIL LIBERTIES, Spring/Summer
1991, at 2.
144. E.g., Raymond G. Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black- The Balancer of Absolutes, 59
CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1971) (noting that Black was "a staunch defender of dissident
voices during the McCarthy era . . . [and] a proponent for rights of racial equality").
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With twenty-twenty hindsight, we now see how exaggerated
our earlier fears were that Communist authoritarianism would de-
feat individual liberty. I fervently hope that, in the near future, we
will have a similar view about current concerns that racism and
sexism could triumph over individual equality. In both cases, free
speech plays a vital role in defeating doctrines at odds with human
rights. Thus, as Supreme Court Justices such as Brandeis and Black
repeatedly reminded us, in the very situations when it seems we
have the most to fear in defending free speech-then, above all, do
we actually have even more to fear in not defending free speech.
As Justice Black wrote,
Fears of [certain] ideologies have frequently agitated the
nation and inspired legislation aimed at suppressing . ..
those ideologies. At such times the fog of public excite-
ment obscures the ancient landmarks set up in our Bill of
Rights. Yet then, of all times, should [we] adhere most
closely to the course they mark. 45
145. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 453 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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